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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="en"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">bricslawjournal</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="en">BRICS Law Journal</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="ru"><trans-title>Юридический журнал БРИКС</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">2409-9058</issn><issn pub-type="epub">2412-2343</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Publishing House V.Ема</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.21684/2412-2343-2023-10-3-65-86</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">bricslawjournal-874</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>ARTICLE</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>The Practice of Efficiency Defense in Antitrust Cases: A Comparison of BRICS and European Cases</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="ru"><trans-title></trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Ribeiro</surname><given-names>E. P.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Professor, Institute of Economics, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">eribeiro@ie.ufrj.br</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Golovanova</surname><given-names>S.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Professor, National Research University Higher School of Economics</p><p>25/12 Bolshaya Pecherskaya St., Nizhny Novgorod, 603155</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">svgolovanova@hse.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-2"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff xml:lang="en" id="aff-1"><institution>Federal University of Rio de Janeiro</institution><country>Brazil</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en" id="aff-2"><institution>National Research University Higher School of Economics</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2023</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>12</day><month>10</month><year>2023</year></pub-date><volume>10</volume><issue>3</issue><fpage>65</fpage><lpage>86</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Ribeiro E.P., Golovanova S., 2023</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2023</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Ribeiro E.P., Golovanova S.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Ribeiro E.P., Golovanova S.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.bricslawjournal.com/jour/article/view/874">https://www.bricslawjournal.com/jour/article/view/874</self-uri><abstract><p>In non-merger antitrust cases efficiencies should play a significant role when authorities decide on cases as many potentially anticompetitive practices may have pro-competition effects, according to economic theory. In many jurisdictions rule of reason or effect based legal standard is claimed to be the policy adopted according to the own authorities. For such legal standards, considering efficiencies is part of the standard analysis protocol. We review the practice of efficiency defense in antitrust cases in selected BRICS and European countries. The case study shows that efficiencies are considered in rulings less often than expected. Similar arguments are used across countries, suggesting a common underlying economic analysis across jurisdictions that may have different legal institutions. We have employed the cross-country comparison based on Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa cases. We also summarize the main reasons for efficiencies analysis not to be able to reverse the concluded anticompetitive effect from a business practice.</p></abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>competition law enforcement</kwd><kwd>efficiency defense</kwd><kwd>anticompetitive agreements</kwd><kwd>case study</kwd><kwd>Brazil</kwd><kwd>Russia</kwd><kwd>India</kwd><kwd>and South Africa</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Ahlborn C. et al. The Antitrust Economics of Tying: A Farewell to Per Se Illegality, 49(1-2) Antitrust Bulletin 287 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X0404900108</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Ahlborn C. et al. 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