bricslawjournalBRICS Law JournalЮридический журнал БРИКС2409-90582412-2343Publishing House V.Ема10.21684/2412-2343-2026-13-2-208-231bricslawjournal-1759Research ArticleCOMMENTSFiscal Federalism and Intergovernmental Distribution of VAT in BRICS CountriesBachurinD.

Dmitry Bachurin – Leading Researcher, Laboratory “Functional Foundations of Social Behavior Modeling,” Center for Innovative Design and Applied Research

7a Krasina St., Tyumen, 625003

01ter@mail.ruUniversity of TyumenRussian Federation202601072026132208231Copyright © Bachurin D., 20262026Bachurin D.Bachurin D.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://www.bricslawjournal.com/jour/article/view/1759

The article suggests a comparative analysis of the legal framework for the distribution of value added tax between different levels of the budget in the BRICS states—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and the Republic of South Africa. The aim of the study is to identify general patterns and unique national models that have developed in the context of federal or decentralized state structures. Drawing on an analysis of the constitutional norms and the tax and budget legislation of these countries, the author identifies three main approaches. China demonstrates a centralized model where equal sharing of VAT revenues is combined with a system of strictly targeted redistribution of funds for the implementation of economic development plans. India exemplifies a cooperative model based on joint decision‑making by the centre and the states through a special council and an independent commission that set out detailed distribution formulas. Brazil and South Africa can be seen as opposite poles. The Brazilian system, owing to the detailed constitutional entrenchment of state rights, is characterized by internal contradictions and stagnation, whereas the South African system is marked by strong centralization and the passive dependence of provinces on grants. The article emphasizes that, despite the differences, all countries face similar problems: the need to bridge the gap between regional revenues and expenditures, reduce territorial inequality, and create effective incentives for the development of the local economy. The author using the comparative analysis makes contribution to the Russian model, i.e., to avoid extreme models, develop a system that combines stable regional revenues with nationwide oversight, and gradually transform financial assistance to territories into an instrument for stimulating specific socio‑economic development. The scientific contribution of the research lies in a comprehensive comparison of the legal frameworks for VAT distribution in the largest developing economies of the BRICS group, which makes it possible to identify strategic guidelines for improving intergovernmental fiscal relations.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.